Recent #national security news in the semiconductor industry
➀ The UK Space Agency (UKSA) has achieved a record six-month period for contract wins involving the European Space Agency (ESA).
➁ The agency highlights a significant increase in funds for ESA programmes, with an additional £112 million (€134 million) in contracts for the UK space sector between June 2022 and December 2024.
➂ The UK now receives 99p back in contracts for every £1 invested, after overheads, marking an improvement from the previous 93p.
➀ The expansion of TSMC's fabs in Arizona raises concerns in Taiwan about the potential loss of its 'Silicon Shield';
➁ TSMC has assured Taiwan that it will maintain the most advanced technology in Taiwan and that the foreign fabs are not the most advanced;
➂ The Taiwan government's approval is required for TSMC's foreign investments above $45.5 million.
➀ China has decided to impose export controls on tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, and indium-related items to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations related to non-proliferation.
➁ The announcement requires exporters to apply for licenses from the Ministry of Commerce in accordance with relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items.
➂ These metals are of significant strategic and industrial value, widely used in various industries and considered as important strategic resources.
➀ The Biden-Harris administration is investigating China's production of mature process semiconductors under the 301 trade law, citing national security threats and reducing U.S. dependence on these chips.
➁ The U.S. Trade Representative's office is initiating a 301 investigation to review China's targeting of mature semiconductors as a dominant position and its impact on the U.S. economy.
➂ The U.S. is investing in the entire semiconductor supply chain, including upstream materials like silicon carbide and wafers, with billions of dollars in private sector investments.
➀ The Biden-Harris administration is investigating China's production of mature process semiconductors under the 301 trade law, citing national security threats and reducing U.S. dependence on these chips.
➁ The U.S. Trade Representative's office is initiating a 301 investigation to review China's targeting of mature semiconductors as a dominant position and its impact on the U.S. economy.
➂ The U.S. is investing in the entire semiconductor supply chain, including upstream materials like silicon carbide and wafers, with billions of dollars in private sector investments.
➀ Cisco has issued a notice to suppliers to strictly enforce the provision of chip origin certificates, requiring products to be free of China-made chips;
➁ The standard for COO certification has been upgraded from the final packaging location to the production site of the chips and masks, to ensure no 'origin washing';
➂ Cisco's network communication equipment involves national security considerations, necessitating strict tracing of chip origin;
➃ Dell, another PC manufacturer, has also planned to stop using China-made chips by 2024;
➄ HP, another PC manufacturer, is transferring some production capacity out of China, with the exclusion of China-made chips in the supply chain still under evaluation;
➅ The exclusion of China-made chips by US manufacturers could have a severe negative impact on local supply chain vendors in China;
➆ If US manufacturers want to retain the Chinese market, they may not require the exclusion of China-made components in products sold in China.
➀ The new regulations will take effect from January 2, 2025, targeting investments in China in semiconductors, quantum, and AI technologies that may pose a national security threat;
➁ The U.S. government has been strictly limiting the export of advanced semiconductors to China and has enhanced the review of inward direct investments from China by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS);
➂ The restrictions will include acquisitions of Chinese enterprise shares and joint ventures in targeted areas, as well as investments in advanced semiconductor companies and quantum research facilities in China.
➀ Current Western export controls have slowed China's progress in advanced logic, but are not perfect or infallible.
➁ Loopholes in restrictions include offshore manufacturing, end-use workarounds, and renaming/reclassifying technologies.
➂ Huawei's fab network poses a national security concern, exploiting sanctions and advancing domestic semiconductor supply chains.
➃ WFE suppliers' lobbying for relaxed controls is refuted by strong business performance and long-term market share impacts from domestic Chinese firms.
➄ Suggestions for improving export controls include expanding the entity list, aligning ally restrictions, tightening supply chain restrictions, and improving enforcement.